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THE MICRO AND MACRO CAUSES OF PRISON 
GROWTH 
John F. Pfaff* 
 
Over the past four decades, prison populations in the United States 
have exploded. As Figure 1 demonstrates, from the 1920s (when 
reliable statistics first become available) through the mid-1970s, the 
incarceration rate hovered around 100 per 100,000 people.1 These 
rates were so stable that a leading criminologist argued in 1979 that 
political pressures would continue to keep the rate around 100 per 
100,000.2 Thus, the subsequent quintupling of the incarceration rate 
over the next forty years, with the prison population growing by over 
1.3 million inmates, was an unexpected and unprecedented 
development.3 
Moreover, this boom was unique to the United States. While home 
to only about 5% of the world’s population, the United States 
currently contains nearly 25% of the world’s prisoners.4 And the 
                                                                                                                                         
* Associate Professor, Fordham Law School. My thanks to Craig Langley at the Census Bureau for 
providing me with the complete Annual Survey of Government Finances data set, and to participants at 
the Georgia State University Law Review 2012 Symposium for helpful comments and questions. All 
errors are my own. 
 1. Unless otherwise stated, “incarceration rate” refers to the prison incarceration rate, not the 
aggregate prison-and-jail incarceration rate. In Figure 1, “in custody” and “under jurisdiction” refer to 
two ways the Bureau of Justice Statistics counts inmates. A change in methods in 1977 led to a slight 
discontinuous jump in that year. 
 2. Alfred Blumstein & Soumyo Moitra, An Analysis of the Time Series of the Imprisonment Rate in 
the States of the United States: A Further Test of the Stability of Punishment Hypothesis, 70 J. CRIM. L. 
& CRIMINOLOGY 376, 376 (1979). Specifically, they state that as prison populations rise, “police can 
choose not to arrest, prosecutors can choose not to press charges, judges can choose not to imprison, or 
parole boards can choose to [sic] deny requests.” Id. at 377. 
 3. PAUL GUERINO, PAIGE M. HARRISON & WILLIAM J. SABOL, PRISONERS IN 2010, at 14 (2011). It 
should be pointed out that there is substantial variation across states in rates of prison growth. In 
particular, five states (Delaware, Maryland, Michigan, New Jersey, and New York) saw average annual 
declines in prison populations over the entire 2000s. Id. at 3 fig.3. 
 4. ROY WALMSLEY, WORLD PRISON POPULATION LIST (8th ed. 2010). This list focuses on the 
prison-and-jail incarceration rate, rather than the prison-specific rate. In 2010, inmates in jail made up 
approximately 33% of all inmates (748,728 out of 2,266,832). See SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
STATISTICS ONLINE, available at http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t612010.pdf. Only China, 
however, also has more than one million people in prison and jails combined: the United States prison 
population is thus larger than the prison-and-jail populations in all other countries (except perhaps 
China). WALMSLEY, supra, at 4. 
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company we keep is troubling. Figure 2 compares the U.S. prison-
and-jail incarceration rate to other high-incarceration countries as 
well as to a sample of our political and cultural allies. Our 
incarceration “peers” are countries such as Russia, Cuba, and 
Kazakhstan, while our allies have rates often six or seven times 
lowers than ours. 
 
In this Article, I want to examine what we know—and what we do 
not know—about the causes behind this remarkable development. In 
particular, I want to focus on two distinct questions, the micro and 
the macro. The micro question is the “who” question. The criminal 
justice system is not a coherent “system” of actors but a sprawling 
web of competing institutions: police, prosecutors, judges, 
legislators, governors, and parole boards, all of whom respond to 
different constituencies and have different incentives. It is thus 
important to ask which actors are driving prison populations 
upwards. 
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The macro question is the “why” question. Clearly, something 
must have changed in the 1970s to cause prison populations to 
increase so dramatically. Was the spike just a natural response to 
rising crime rates during the 1960s and 1970s, or was there a deeper 
cause—a change in economic conditions or in politics, or perhaps a 
reaction against the civil rights movement? If we want to understand 
how we got where we are and where we can go, it is essential to 
understand not just who got us here, but why. 
As I show below, we know the answer to the micro question much 
better than that to the macro. On the micro side, data indicate that at 
least since 1994, prison growth has been driven primarily by 
prosecutors increasing the rate at which they file charges against 
arrestees. None of the other possible sources seems to matter: arrests 
(and arrests per crime), prison admissions per felony filing, and time 
served have generally been flat or falling over that time. Due to 
limitations in the data, it is harder to assign responsibility prior to 
1994, but the data we have suggest that time served in prison was still 
mostly flat during that time, and that at least a chunk of the increase 
in admissions was due to rising crime rates. 
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It is harder to make such concrete statements about the macro 
factors. Changes in crime rates, economic conditions (in particular 
state fiscal capacity), political attitudes, and racial policies all 
certainly played roles in driving up prison populations. Trends in 
crime and state resources have been important. But we have less solid 
quantitative evidence concerning the political and racial factors. Of 
course, these complex social phenomena do not lend themselves to 
easy quantification. However, a less obvious problem exists: studies 
examining these issues tend to focus on national and state-level 
actors, despite the fact that it appears county prosecutors bear the 
largest responsibility. Although it will be possible to tease out some 
of the theories’ implications for county-level officials, these will 
unfortunately be somewhat speculative. 
This Article proceeds as follows. Part 1 discusses the micro causes 
of prison growth, and Part 2 the macro causes and their implications 
for reform efforts. 
1. THE MICRO CAUSES OF PRISON GROWTH 
In order to understand why prison populations have grown, it is 
first essential to figure out where the growth has occurred. To start, 
two major “locations” for growth exist: the number of prison 
admissions and length of time served. In this section, I will first show 
that longer sentences do not explain United States prison growth—
ours is an admissions-driven boom. In the second part of this section, 
I will thus examine where in the admissions process growth is 
occurring. After all, the growth in admissions can be driven by 
changes in crimes, arrests per crime, felony filings per arrest, 
convictions per filing, and admissions per conviction; my results 
indicate that, at least since the 1990s, increases in filing-per-arrest 
have been the most important source of growth. 
1.1   The Story Is Not One of Increasing Severity 
The conventional perception of punishment in the United States is 
that we are imposing increasingly longer sentences on offenders. For 
4
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example, Franklin Zimring has stated that since the 1990s our 
criminal justice system has focused on “throw[ing] away the key.”5 
The media often provides stories of low-level offenders receiving 
severe sentences, and state legislatures have passed a rash of punitive 
laws, such as three-strikes and truth-in-sentencing laws.6 
But in practice, sentence lengths have generally remained 
relatively short, and evidence suggests that sentence lengths do not 
explain much of the increase in the U.S. prison population. For 
example, I have shown that in eleven predominantly northern states 
(chosen solely due to limitations in the data) median time spent in 
prison hovered around one year from the late 1980s through the early 
2000s, with lows of six months in states like California and Illinois.7 
Moreover, data from these states clearly demonstrate that trends in 
admissions, not releases, drove their prison growth. Changes in 
sentence lengths had no noticeable effects on prison populations in 
these states, but prison populations in all eleven states would have 
flattened, and sometimes even fallen, by the mid- to late-1990s had 
admissions levels not grown. 
Furthermore, in a recent paper I demonstrate that these findings are 
generalizable to the country as a whole.8 There is actually a fairly 
simple way to show that increased severity is unlikely to be the 
primary engine of population growth. Figure 3 plots annual 
admissions and releases from prison. If sentences were getting 
significantly longer, we should expect to see the dotted releases line 
grow more slowly relative to the solid admissions line—the gap 
between the two should widen. But except for a brief period in the 
                                                                                                                                         
 5. Franklin E. Zimring, Imprisonment Rates and the New Politics of Criminal Punishment, 3 
PUNISHMENT & SOC’Y 161, 162 (2001). 
 6. For an overview of these developments, see John F. Pfaff, The Continued Vitality of Structured 
Sentencing Following Blakely: The Effectiveness of Voluntary Guidelines, 54 UCLA L. REV. 235, 242–
47 (2006). 
 7. John F. Pfaff, The Myths and Realities of Correctional Severity: Evidence From the National 
Corrections Reporting Program on Sentencing Practices, 13 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 491, 494 (2011) 
[hereinafter Pfaff, Correctional Severity]; John F. Pfaff, The Durability of Prison Populations, 2010 U. 
CHI. LEGAL F. 73, 81 (2010) [hereinafter Pfaff, Durability]. 
 8. John F. Pfaff, The Causes of Growth in Prison Populations and Admissions, (Working Paper No. 
1884674, 2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1884674. 
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early 1990s, that simply does not happen; as we enter the 2000s, the 
gap actually narrows. 
 
Thus, sentence length does not appear to drive prison growth, 
implying that admissions must be doing the heavy lifting. This is 
good news for those who wish to rein in or reduce prison growth: 
significant, immediate gains can be made simply by admitting fewer 
people, rather than having to wait for long-serving inmates to 
gradually leave prison.9 I turn now to the causes of admissions 
growth. 
1.2   The Causes of Admissions Growth 
There are five “locations” where admissions growth can take 
place: crimes, arrests per crime, felony filings per arrest, felony 
convictions per filing, and prison admissions per conviction. Studies 
have tried to rigorously identify the relative importance of these 
                                                                                                                                         
 9. A small core of long-serving inmates establishes a floor that will take some time to decay, absent 
executive fiats releasing them. But reduced admissions can still cause substantial reductions in the 
prison population within only two or three years. See Pfaff, Durability, supra note 7, at 84. 
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locations, but they have looked at only a subset of these factors: 
crimes, arrests per crime, and admissions per arrest.10 This is due to a 
limitation in the data: there is very little publicly available data on 
prosecutorial behavior. In a recent paper, however, I exploit a 
seemingly unused dataset on such behavior that allows me to look at 
trends in crimes, arrests per crime, felony filings per arrest, 
admissions per felony filing, and time served per admission.11 
Adequate data on the “convictions” step remains harder to gather, but 
this model is still a significant improvement on past efforts. 
This section thus proceeds as follows. I start by briefly looking at 
what we know about the importance of trends in crime rates and 
arrests over the whole period of the boom, 1977 to 2010. I then 
discuss my results about the role of prosecutors starting in 1994, the 
first year for which I have reliable prosecutorial data. This is actually 
not an important limitation: crime has been dropping steadily since 
1991, so the causal forces at work prior to 1991 are likely different 
than those at work now. 
It is easy to summarize the basic findings I present here: (1) 
Growth in crime appears to have been an important engine of growth 
prior to the mid-1990s; (2) there has been no change in arrests per 
crime in decades; (3) starting in the 1990s, felony filings per arrest 
have risen significantly; and (4) admissions per conviction have 
remained flat. 
Factor 1: Crime Rates. Figure 4 plots violent and property crime 
rates (per 100,000 people) since 1960. Two trends stand out. First, 
between 1960 and 1991 violent and property crimes rise 
dramatically, except for a brief lull in the early 1980s. During that 
thirty-two year period, violent crime rates grew by 371% (or 11.6% 
per year) and property crime rates by 198% (or 6.2% per year). 
Second, from 1991 through today, crime rates have steadily declined, 
                                                                                                                                         
 10. See Alfred Blumstein & Allen J. Beck, Population Growth in the U.S. Prisons, 1980–1996, in 
PRISONS 17 (Michael Tonry & Joan Petersilia eds., 1999); Alfred Blumstein & Allen J. Beck, Reentry as 
a Transient State Between Liberty and Recommitment, in PRISONER REENTRY AND CRIME IN AMERICA 
(Jeremy Travis & Christy Visher eds., 2005); Scott Boggess & John Bound, Did Criminal Activity 
Increase During the 1980s?: Comparisons across Data Sources, 78 SOC. SCI. Q. 725 (1997); Patrick A 
Langan, America’s Soaring Prison Population, 251 SCI. 1568 (1991). 
 11. Pfaff, supra note 8. 
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with violent crime rates falling by 48% and property crime by 43% 
by 2010.12 
It is plausible that rising crime through 1991 would push up prison 
populations. Plausible, perhaps, but not inevitable: Canada’s crime 
rates have risen and fallen roughly in sync with those in the United 
States, yet its incarceration rate barely budged from 100 per 100,000 
between 1981 and 2001.13 An increase in crime thus does not 
inexorably lead to an increase in prisoners; some care must be taken 
to identify the relationship between the two. 
 
Measuring this relationship is difficult, however, due to an 
important statistical challenge. Crime rates and prison populations 
are endogenous, which means that each causally influences the other: 
prison levels shape crime rates, and crime rates help determine prison 
populations. For technical reasons, studies that fail to account for this 
                                                                                                                                         
 12. Note, though, that even in 2010 nationwide violent crime was still 151% above its 1960 levels 
and property crime 94% above its 1960 levels. Pfaff, supra note 8. 
 13. See ROGER BOE, RESEARCH BRIEF: COMPARING CRIME AND IMPRISONMENT TRENDS IN THE 
UNITED STATES, ENGLAND, AND CANADA FROM 1981 TO 2001 (2004), available at http://www.csc-
scc.gc.ca/text/rsrch/briefs/b29/b29_e.pdf; Raymond Paternoster, How Much Do We Really Know About 
Criminal Deterrence?, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 765, 798 (2010). 
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causal intertwining are likely to understate the effect of crime rates 
on prison populations—and all but one paper that look at this issue 
make just this oversight.14 
The one paper that accounts for the endogenous relationship 
between prison and crime, by Yair Listokin, relies on a clever but 
controversial empirical maneuver.15 Assuming we accept his 
technique, his results suggest that between 1985 and 1997 each 1% 
increase in crime rates led to a 1.07% increase in prison admissions. 
Note, though, that the error bars around that estimate are quite 
large,16 and the potential limitations of his method for addressing 
endogeneity should not be taken lightly. 
Roughly speaking, however, Listokin’s results suggest that 
increases in crime, and violent crime in particular, could explain up 
to half the growth in prison admissions between 1985 and 1991. 
During that time, violent crime rates rose by about 5% per year (and 
total crime rates by 2% per year), and prison admissions by 9%. At 
the very least, Listokin’s model provides some evidence that trends 
in crime played an important, but by no means dispositive, role in 
prison growth during the 1980s. 
Note, too, an interesting collateral implication of the paper. 
Listokin’s results run through 1997, well into the sustained crime 
drop that began in 1991. If his results are accurate both before and 
after 1991—and Listokin does not break out his analysis in this 
way—then his results suggest that the crime decline has acted as a 
major brake on prison growth since 1991. 
Factor 2: Arrests per Crime. Arrests per crime is an easy factor 
to dismiss. Figure 5A provides the clearance rates for eight major 
categories of crime between 1972 and 2004. Clearance rates measure 
                                                                                                                                         
 14. I survey these papers and explain the implications of this failure—which are severe—in John F. 
Pfaff, The Empirics of Prison Growth: A Critical Review and Path Forward, 98 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 547 (2008). 
 15. Yair Listokin, Does More Crime Mean More Prisoners? An Instrumental Variables Approach, 
46 J.L. & ECON. 181 (2003). For readers with a technical background, Listokin uses abortion rates as an 
instrumental variable for crime, building on John Donohue & Steven Levitt, The Impact of Legalized 
Abortion on Crime, 116 Q. J. ECON. 379 (2001). The instrument works best if abortion has no effect on 
prison populations except through crime rates, which is certainly not the case. The extent to which this 
undermines the instrument is, unfortunately, unclear. 
 16. The standard error for his point estimate of 1.07 is 0.70. Listokin, supra note 15, at 191. 
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the percent of crimes for which charges are filed; as Figure 5A 
clearly demonstrates, clearance rates have been relatively flat (or, for 
murder, declining) for three decades. Thus, at least for violent and 
property crimes, changes in arrests per crime cannot explain prison 
growth. 
10
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Moreover, since 1991 the absolute number of arrests for violent 
and property crimes have fallen, thanks to the drop in crime. Adding 
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in drug arrests does not change the story noticeably. Figure 5B plots 
the number of annual arrests between 1994 and 2008 for violent, 
property, and non-marijuana drug offenses.17 Despite an uptick in 
arrests in the 2000s, the overall number of arrests fell by 8.4%. 
Factor 3: Felony Filings per Arrest.18 Micro studies of prison 
growth have generally moved from arrests per crime to admissions 
per arrest, solely as a concession to the absence of data on 
prosecutorial behavior. Yet it turns out such data exists: the National 
Center on State Courts gathers data on the number of felony filings 
per year in criminal courts. There are two limits to the data. First, the 
NCSC revised how it gathered the data in 1994, making it impossible 
to compare data before and after 1994; and second, not every state 
provides data every year. As a result, I can examine felony filings 
trends from 1994 to 2008 for thirty-four states; these states are shown 
in Figure 6.19 
Figure 7A plots the total number of cases filed in the thirty-four 
state sample against the number of prisoners admitted. Between 1994 
and 2008, filings grew by 37.4% and admissions by a nearly identical 
40%. This is actually a more remarkable number than it might first 
appear. As Figure 5B demonstrates, this is a period of declining 
arrests: in my thirty-four state sample, arrests20 fell by 10.1%, 
slightly above the national decline of 8.4%. Thus, filings and 
admissions rose significantly during a period when the number of 
defendants declined sharply. 
                                                                                                                                         
 17. I focus on non-marijuana drug arrests since very few defendants are sent to prison on marijuana 
charges, and drug arrest data does not distinguish between misdemeanor and felony arrests. Due to 
limitations in the data, Washington, DC, Florida, Kansas, and New York are excluded. 
 18. The discussion here draws heavily on Pfaff, supra note 8. 
 19. Data from the lighter-shaded states are slightly less reliable than those from the darker-shaded 
states, but the results are the same whether the less reliable states are included or not. 
 20. From here on, I will use “arrests” to refer to arrests for violent, property, and non-marijuana drug 
offenses. 
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Fig. 6: States Providing Data on Felony Filings 
 
 
Figure 7B illuminates just how important this change in 
prosecutorial behavior has been. The solid line is the number of 
prisoners actually admitted each year, and the dotted line is the 
number that would have been admitted had the filings-per-arrest rate 
remained fixed at its 1994 level. Had that rate, which rose from 0.375 
in 1994 to 0.573 in 2008, remained constant, admissions in 2008 
would have been approximately 36% below what they actually were 
that year and just over 10% below where they actually were back in 
1994. 
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Factor 4: Admissions per Filing. Admissions per filing is another 
factor that is easy to exclude. In my thirty-four state sample, 
admissions per filing remain almost perfectly flat between 1994 and 
2008, rising from 0.258 to 0.264 and peaking at 0.271 in 1999; these 
distinctions are fairly trivial. Once the prosecutor decided to file 
charges, the likelihood of going to prison did not change in any 
meaningful way during the 1990s and 2000s. 
An Important Aside: Prosecutors vs. Parole Officers. My claim 
here is that prosecutors have driven prison growth in recent decades. 
But there is another path to prison admissions that does not fit the 
prosecutorial story so clearly: parole violations. At least outside of 
California, however, it seems unlikely that these violations have 
driven prison growth. I have developed this argument in some detail 
elsewhere,21 so I will just make two brief points here. First, in 
general, the percent of annual admissions from parole has not 
fluctuated much, increasing in my sample of eleven states from about 
30% of admissions to 40% over the 1990s; a wider-looking study by 
the Bureau of Justice Statistics reported a similar value of 35%.22 
California is the one exception (at around 60% to 70%), but it is such 
an outlier that the Bureau of Justice Statistics often discusses 
California separately when providing parole statistics. 
Second, and more important, while parole admissions are up, so 
too are parole releases. In fact, as shown in Figure 8, parole releases 
are always greater than parole admissions, and release and 
admissions rates tend to track each other closely. So are parole 
admissions causing prison growth, or are larger prison populations 
leading to more parole releases that in turn generate more parole 
violations? The following metaphor is helpful: when bailing out a 
boat using a bucket with a leak in it, is the water leaking out of the 
bucket and back into the boat causing the water levels in the boat to 
rise? It is true that a bucket with no leak at all would bail out the boat 
even faster, but the leak is not really causing the water to get there in 
the first place. So too with parole violations. 
                                                                                                                                         
 21. See Pfaff, Correctional Severity, supra note 7. 
 22. PAUL GUERINO, PAIGE M. HARRISON & WILLIAM J. SOBOL, PRISONERS IN 2010, at 6 (2011). 
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*** 
Thus, to summarize: Prison growth has been driven by admissions, 
and at least since the early 1990s admissions have been driven by 
prosecutorial filing decisions. Changing prosecutorial behavior could 
have played an important role prior to the 1990s as well. Steadily 
rising crime rates likely contributed to growing prison populations, 
although, as Canada’s experience shows, such a connection is not 
inevitable. Moreover, even the high-end estimates of crime’s effect 
on incarceration can explain only about half the growth in 
admissions. Thus, it is possible that other actors’ behaviors, including 
that of prosecutors, changed during the years of rising crime (perhaps 
in part because of that rising crime). 
It is therefore worth asking what broad macro-level shifts 
motivated these changes. The next section considers several possible 
theories, but I want to temper expectations. There has been too little 
quantitative work tracing out the relative importance of these 
theories. Furthermore, most of the analyses have looked at state- and 
federal-level actors, while my results here indicate that county-level 
officials—who may face qualitatively different pressures—have been 
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at the forefront of prison growth. The next section will discuss these 
theories broadly, and it will try as best as possible to tease out some 
policy implications from them. 
2. THE MACRO CAUSES OF PRISON GROWTH 
To explain the macro causes of prison growth, commentators have 
generally considered three main theories besides changing crime 
rates: changing political conditions, changing economic conditions, 
and changing demographics of potential offenders. Studies have also 
considered the importance of the deinstitutionalization of the 
mentally ill, changes in sentencing laws, and the role of court orders 
regulating population size. Unfortunately, our empirical 
understanding of the absolute and relative importance of these 
theories remains quite weak.23 
Rather than simply summarizing these theories (and our limited 
empirical knowledge about them), I want to examine two macro-level 
questions that are closely tied to this symposium’s theme of the 
relationship between the current economic crisis and prison growth. 
First, to what extent is recent prison growth simply the result of 
expanding state fiscal capacity? The closer this connection, the more 
the current crisis provides an opportunity for reform. And second, to 
the extent that prison populations have grown faster than overall state 
spending, how important are changing political views (including 
those with respect to race) to this growth? 
2.1 Expanded State Fiscal Capacity 
The current financial crisis may encourage states to seriously rein 
in their use of incarceration; that 2011 marked the first decline in 
total prison populations since 1972 is likely not coincidental. This 
section thus examines the connection between state prison growth 
and state fiscal resources. A rough hypothesis can help guide the 
discussion. Broadly speaking, if state resources are driving prison 
                                                                                                                                         
 23. Pfaff, supra note 14. 
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growth, then corrections’ share of state expenditures should hold 
constant; if prison growth reflects increased punitiveness, then 
corrections’ share should rise. It is essential to make clear that 
observing stable expenditures shares does not prove that state fiscal 
capacity is driving growth, but it at least supports that story’s 
plausibility.24 
To start, Figure 9A plots total real per capita revenues and 
expenditures for all state governments from 1952 to 2008. State 
spending grows steadily from the 1950s to the mid-1970s and again 
from the 1980s through the late 2000s. Thus, the general rise in 
incarceration, and that during the crime drop in particular, coincides 
with increasing state and local spending across the board. 
                                                                                                                                         
 24. The old saw that correlation does not imply causation applies. For example, corrections’ share of 
the budget could remain flat in the presence of increased punitiveness if that increase coincides with 
technical advances that reduce the cost of each “unit” of punishment. The results I provide here cannot 
uncover such an effect. That said, if corrections’ share of the budget remains flat, we learn that the 
simple “we became more punitive” story is at least incomplete. 
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Figure 9B then plots corrections’ share of state spending, using 
three increasingly restrictive definitions of “spending” to reflect 
William Spelman’s concern that state laws and federal mandates put 
much of state spending beyond the day-to-day reach of legislators.25 
The lowest curve depicts corrections’ share of all spending, and the 
two higher curves corrections’ shares of various, more-discretionary 
subsets of that amount.26 For all three definitions, the same general 
pattern emerges. Corrections’ share remains flat until the mid-1970s, 
grows steadily until the mid-1990s, and then falls and flattens into 
and throughout the 2000s. In 2008, corrections’ share of the various 
measures of expenditure was 2.9% (up from 1.4% in 1952), 7.0% (up 
from 3.8% in 1952), and 9.8% (up from 5.0% in 1952), respectively. 
Thus, for many years, spending on corrections did grow somewhat 
faster than overall state fiscal capacity, but a few years into the crime 
decline corrections’ share of the budget generally flattened or even 
fell. 
Thus, at least since the mid-1990s spending on corrections and 
spending overall have been highly correlated. It is quite likely that 
this connection is somewhat causal. In a more rigorous analysis of 
this issue, Spelman argued that up to 30% of the variation in state 
prison populations could be explained by variations in state 
resources.27 And tellingly, the number of states whose prison 
populations declined rose significantly at the end of the 2000s, as the 
crisis erupted and worsened.28 
                                                                                                                                         
 25. William Spelman, Crime, Cash, and Limited Options: Explaining the Prison Boom, 8 
CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 29, 40–41 (2009). 
 26. The middle curve adopts Spelman’s definition of discretionary spending, which is total spending 
minus spending on welfare, health and hospitals, highways, primary and secondary education, and 
interest on debt. The highest curve further reduces Spelman’s budget by removing expenditures on 
insurance trust programs like workers’ compensation and unemployment insurance. 
 27. Spelman, supra note 25, at 63. 
 28. In 2005, eleven states saw their prison populations shrink at an average rate of 1.9%. In 2006, the 
number dropped to nine states, although the average decline rose to 2.3%. In 2007, the number of states 
with declining populations rose to fifteen (average of 1%), in 2008 to sixteen (average of 1.6%), and in 
2009 and 2010 twenty-four (with averages of 1.8% and then, most dramatically, 2.7%, respectively). 
Allen J. Beck & Paige M. Harrison, Prisoners in 2005 Summary, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS (Nov. 
30, 2006), http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/index.cfm?ty=pbdetail&iid=912; WILLIAM J. SABOL, HEATHER 
COUTURE & PAIGE M. HARRISON, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, PRISONERS IN 2006, at 2 (2007); 
HEATHER C. WEST & WILLIAM J. SABOL, PRISONERS IN 2007, at 2 (2008); WILLIAM J. SABOL, 
HEATHER C. WEST & MATTHEW COOPER, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, PRISONERS IN 2008, at 17–
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Note that the stability of corrections’ share of the budget may 
explain the durability of a well-documented criminal justice moral 
hazard problem. Prosecutors are county officials, but the state pays to 
incarcerate the defendants they convict; we should thus expect 
prosecutors to “overuse” prison beds, since neither they nor their 
constituents bear the full cost.29 These results suggest that state-level 
officials may have been willing to tolerate these moral hazard costs 
because they were not particularly important—they do not appear to 
have crowded out spending on other programs.30 State-level 
politicians continued to adopt “tough-on-crime” positions without 
appearing to have to sacrifice other programs they favored. Tellingly, 
the onset of the financial crisis has seen state-level officials begin to 
rein in county-level actors. Many efforts have been blunt, such as 
gubernatorial furloughs and early releases. California, at least, is 
targeting the moral hazard problem more directly by attempting to 
require county jails to maintain custody of some drug offenders who 
previously would have gone to state prison.31 
As states seem more willing to push responsibility back on the 
counties, it is worth considering the link between local fiscal capacity 
and prison growth. Figure 10A plots the total real per capita revenue 
and expenditures by all local (i.e., below state-level) governments. 
The pattern looks quite similar to that in Figure 9A, which perhaps 
should not be surprising. About one-third of local revenues are 
intergovernmental transfers from the state budget, so the two graphs 
are not independent. Figure 10B then plots the share of narrowly-
                                                                                                                                         
18 (2009); HEATHER C. WEST, WILLIAM J. SABOL & SARAH J. GREENMAN, BUREAU OF JUSTICE 
STATISTICS, PRISONERS IN 2009, at 16 (2010); PAUL GUERINO, PAIGE M. HARRISON & WILLIAM J. 
SABOL, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, PRISONERS IN 2009, at 14 (2011). 
 29. W. David Ball, Tough on Crime (on the State’s Dime): How Violent Crime Does Not Drive 
California Counties’ Incarceration Rates—and Why It Should, 28 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 987 (2012); see 
also Robert L. Misner, Recasting Prosecutorial Discretion, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 717 (1996). 
 30. Data from the Annual Survey of State and Local Government Finances indicates that the share of 
total expenditures for most line items in the budget remains fairly constant over time, suggesting little 
direct crowding out. For example, between 1973 and 2008, higher education’s share of the narrow 
definition of discretionary spending hovered at around 36% per year every year (even as corrections’ 
share rose from 5% to 10%). Of course, at some level there was crowding out, since other line items 
could have grown more quickly had corrections’ share declined. But these sorts of more-indirect costs 
are likely less politically salient. 
 31. See Ball, supra note 29. 
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defined local expenditures given over to corrections and to “judicial” 
expenditures, which include funding for prosecutors’ offices (as well 
as for public defenders, the courts, and other judicial expenses).32 
As with the states, local correctional spending has been relatively 
flat since the crime decline began—and judicial spending has even 
declined. Moreover, both correctional and judicial spending 
constitute relatively small shares of overall expenditures. It is 
unclear, however, whether that means local governments are willing 
to take on more spending in these areas: the trends in Figure 10B 
suggest that these governments have not been eager to approve such 
spending, and the reports of deep across-the-board cuts in local 
government spending point to a general lack of local fiscal capacity. 
Though quite tentative due to limitations in the data, these results 
suggest that the current crisis could lead to real cuts in prison 
population size. That, however, begs the question: what will happen 
when the economy inevitably recovers? Will prison and jail 
populations again resume their upward trajectory, or will they stay 
flat? To shed some light on this question, we need to turn away from 
finances and towards politics. Prison populations do not necessarily 
rise even as state fiscal capacity expands: both expenditures and 
crime rose between 1960 and the mid-1970s without any increase in 
prison populations. “Something” changed in the 1970s, and so in the 
next section I look at several theories about what that “something” 
was, and I consider what light these theories can shed on possible 
future trends. 
                                                                                                                                         
 32. The results here start in 1985 due to limitations in the data. 
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2.2 Changing Political Conditions 
Many academics have tied the prison population boom to political 
changes that began in the 1960s and 1970s. I start this section by 
discussing several theories that look at general political shifts, and I 
conclude by briefly evaluating the more specific claim that increased 
punitiveness is a partial reaction against the civil rights movement. 
2.2.1 General Political Shifts 
Perhaps the most ambitious general theory is that developed by 
David Garland in his book The Culture of Control.33 Simplifying 
somewhat, Garland argues that a wave of cultural and economic 
shocks during the 1960s and 1970s—the oil crisis, the decline of 
industrialization, changing gender roles, the civil rights movement—
led citizens in the United States (and the United Kingdom) to 
fundamentally rethink the proper goal of government. Voters lost 
faith in the government’s ability to provide for them via the welfare 
state, and instead asked the state to protect them from outside threats, 
crime in particular. This political reordering privileged retributivism 
and incapacitation over rehabilitation, and populist policies over 
more technocratic ones. 
Another theory, advanced by Theodore Caplow and Jonathan 
Simon, suggests that politicians focused more on crime starting in the 
1970s due to the rise of “identity politics.”34 Issues such as abortion 
and civil rights are polarizing topics that provide little room for 
compromise, and thus little room for politicians to draw voters away 
from their opponents. But there was a strong national consensus 
about the need to be “tough on crime,” so politicians used the issue to 
try to poach voters from the other party. There is some quantitative 
support for Caplow and Simon’s theory. One paper, for example, has 
demonstrated that a state’s prison admission rate appears to rise as 
                                                                                                                                         
 33. See generally DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL (2002); see also Michael Tonry, 
Rethinking Unthinkable Punishment Policies in America, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1781 (1999); BERT USEEM 
& ANNE PIEHL, PRISON STATE (2008), provide examples of other authors making similar points. 
 34. Theodore Caplow & Jonathan Simon, Understanding Prison Policy and Population Trends, in 
PRISONS 63, 71 (Michael Tonry & Joan Petersilia eds., 1999). 
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the majority party’s control of the legislature becomes more 
uncertain.35 This is consistent with politicians choosing to deploy 
“tough on crime” policies to attract voters in contested elections. 
Katherine Beckett has put forth a more cynical argument, namely 
that politicians stoke people’s fear of crime to scare them into voting 
for them—tough-on-crime rhetoric is less a response to the public’s 
genuine fear of crime but rather an attempt to make the public fear 
crime in the first place.36 Her evidence for this is survey data 
suggesting the public’s fear of crime lags politicians’ rhetoric about it 
instead of leading it.37 
A common theme ties these theories together. Whether due to the 
public’s loss of faith in the government, to polarizing political issues 
taking on increased importance, or to efforts to literally “scare up” 
votes, these theories argue that by the 1970s politicians had begun to 
devote increasing attention to criminal justice issues. There is no 
doubt that each of these theories has some merit.38 But it is worth 
asking whether these theories remain compelling today. 
A key limitation to all these theories is that they pay too little 
attention to the spike in crime that started in the early 1960s. 
Although concurrent with broad social changes, the dramatic rise in 
crime between 1960 and 1991, shown in Figure 4 above, surely 
influenced people’s views about the proper role of government. In 
fact, Figure 4 may understate why crime became so politically 
salient. Figure 11 plots what I will call the “effective” incarceration 
rate: not the number of prisoners per 100,000 people, but the number 
of prisoners per 1,000 violent and per 1,000 property crimes.39 
                                                                                                                                         
 35. Thomas D. Stucky, Karen Heimer & Joseph B. Lang, Partisan Politics, Electoral Competition 
and Imprisonment: An Analysis of States Over Time, 43 CRIMINOLOGY 211 (2005). 
 36. KATHERINE BECKETT, MAKING CRIME PAY 23 (1997). 
 37. USEEM & PIEHL, supra note 33 point to some limitations in the survey evidence on which 
Beckett relies. 
 38. For more in-depth summaries and critiques of the political theories, please see Pfaff, supra note 
14, and USEEM & PIEHL, supra note 33. 
 39. See USEEM & PIEHL, supra note 33, at 22 fig.2.2. 
25
Pfaff: The Micro and Macro Causes of Prison Growth
Published by Reading Room, 2012
1262 GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 28:4 
 
Figure 11 demonstrates that the effective incarceration rate 
actually declined at the start of the crime boom and then remained 
flat into the early 1980s. Such an apparent “failure” of the criminal 
justice system likely amplified whatever concerns the crime wave 
was producing on its own. It thus seems unlikely that the punitive 
“turn” occurred independently of the crime boom, which then 
suggests that the “politics of crime” of the high-crime 1970s may be 
qualitatively different than those of the low-crime 2010s.40 
And, at least at the national level, there is some anecdotal evidence 
consistent with this claim. Crime policy has not played an important 
role in the past several Presidential or Congressional elections. And it 
is worth noting that during the 2011-12 Republican Presidential 
primary race, no candidate opposing Newt Gingrich’s bid for the 
party’s nomination raised the fact that he helped establish Right on 
                                                                                                                                         
 40. Spelman, supra note 25, at 31 makes a similar point about the central importance of the crime 
boom. 
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Crime, a conservative group committed to reducing prison 
populations.41 
Unfortunately, our understanding of local-level politics is much 
weaker. To start, the interest groups that are powerful at the state 
level are not necessarily the same as those that are powerful at the 
federal level;42 there are surely state/local differences as well, but 
these are even harder to uncover. Moreover, state and local 
politicians often face different electoral pressures. State legislative 
elections, for example, are often much less contested than those for 
Congress,43 and local elections may be less contested still. Given the 
evidence about the link between punitiveness and electoral 
vulnerability, differences in contestation may be important. County-
level actors could be subject to similar political pressures or cultures 
as state- and national-level actors, and it certainly would be 
surprising if there were no correlation at all. But to the extent county 
officials are driving prison growth, we need a richer understanding of 
the particular political environments in which they operate. 
That said, these theories may still provide some insight into how 
local politicians may behave in the years ahead, and what policies 
may be more or less viable. For example, many reforms put forth 
these days are more technocratic in nature: actuarial risk scales, 
diversion courts, various forms of technocorrections. If these 
programs are scaled up too quickly, or implemented poorly, they 
could engender significant pushback. A public whose views are still 
more “protect from” than “provide for” may not have a great 
tolerance for technocratic error—although that tolerance may be 
greater in periods, like today, of lower crime. 
                                                                                                                                         
 41. The list of those who support Right on Crime’s efforts reflects a wide array of prominent 
Republican and conservative politicians and activists. See Statement of Principles, RIGHT ON CRIME, 
http://www.rightoncrime.com/the-conservative-case-for-reform/statement-of-principles/ (last visited 
Mar. 2, 2012). 
 42. See, for example, the list of state interest groups given in Clive S. Thomas & Ronald J. 
Hrebenar, Interest Groups in the States, in POLITICS IN THE AMERICAN STATES Table 100, 119 tbl.4.1 
(Virginia Gray & Russell L. Hanson eds., 2004). 
 43. Between 1988 and 1996, the fraction of Congressional elections that were uncontested fell from 
almost 20% to 5%, while the fraction of uncontested state legislative seats remained stable around 35%. 
See Peverill Squire, Uncontested Seats in State Legislative Elections, 25 LEGIS. STUDIES Q. 131, 133 
(2000). 
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More generally, the decline in crime suggests that crime is less 
salient these days, whether as a tool for reaching out to voters from 
the other party (as Caplow and Simon suggest) or as a means of 
playing on people’s fears (as Beckett argues). Furthermore, the 
current political focus on economic issues likely reduces the salience 
of crime as well. This implies that politicians have room to 
experiment now that they did not have even a few years ago. Yet the 
work of Garland, Beckett, Caplow and Simon and others cautions 
against taking too many risks: if crime starts to rise again, its political 
salience may very well return.44 
2.2.2 Punishment and Civil Rights 
A more specific branch of the political theory considers the extent 
to which some people have tried to use the criminal justice system to 
roll back gains that minorities made via the civil rights movement.45 
Some, like Michelle Alexander, argue that arrests, incarceration, and 
post-release collateral restrictions are used as a form of political 
repression. Others, like Michael Tonry, make a more indirect claim, 
that the collateral costs of incarceration are politically tolerable 
because they fall disproportionately on minorities. Politicians thus 
reap the benefits of appearing tough on crime without facing the full 
political costs of their actions. 
It is clear that race and punishment interact in troubling ways. 
Blacks make up approximately 12% of the US population, but by the 
late 2000s they comprised 28.3% of all arrests, 38% of all those 
convicted of felonies, and 38% of all prisoners.46 And even though 
                                                                                                                                         
 44. Figure 11 highlights one particularly important component to this risk. While crime is lower than 
it has been in decades, both the violent and property crimes rates in 2010 are still twice as high as they 
were in 1960. Older Americans who lived during the periods of lower crime are particularly likely to 
remain sensitive to crime-control concerns. 
 45. See BECKETT, supra note 43; MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW (2010); MICHAEL 
TONRY, MALIGN NEGLECT (1995). A good overview of this literature is given in James Forman Jr., 
Racial Critiques of Mass Incarceration Beyond the New Jim Crow, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. (forthcoming 
2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1966018. 
 46. For the population data, see U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE 
UNITED STATES 2012, at tbl.695 (2012); for the data on arrests, convictions, and prison populations, see 
SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS tbls.4.10, 5.45, & 6.33 (Kathleen Maguire ed., 2012). 
All data are from 2008 except for convictions, which are from 2006. 
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blacks are overrepresented among poorer Americans, these 
disparities—at least for convictions and incarceration—cannot be 
explained by class effects alone, since only 23.5% of American 
families earning under $20,000 self-identified as black.47 Moreover, 
it is undeniable that a sizeable number of whites resent the advances 
that blacks have made in recent decades, and Beckett and others 
provide evidence of tough-on-crime rhetoric being used to signal 
resistance to the Civil Rights movement.48 
Yet the connection between this resistance and prison growth is 
difficult to untangle. In this section I want to touch on just two of the 
leading concerns.49 First, some of the disparity in punishment reflects 
disparities in offending—although some of the racial differences in 
offending could themselves be the product of earlier (racial) 
differences in punishment. Second, drug offenses, which are the 
offenses over which police and prosecutors have the most discretion 
and which thus have been the focus of much of the writing on this 
topic, simply have not contributed that significantly to prison growth, 
at least not directly. 
Start with offense differentials. Some of the racial disparities in 
arrests, convictions, and incarcerations reflect underlying racial 
differences in offending. Blacks engage in higher levels of violent 
and property crimes, so a race-blind system would still arrest and 
convict blacks at a rate greater than their share of the population. For 
a particularly striking example, Figure 12 plots the murder rates for 
white and black males aged 18 to 24; since most murders are 
intraracial, racial differences in victimization correlate to racial 
differences in offending.50 Throughout the sample period, the 
                                                                                                                                         
 47. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, supra note 46, at tbl.695. 
 48. BECKETT, supra note 36, at 31–32. Randall Kennedy has similarly written that a tough-on-crime 
position is often a “thinly veiled code” for expressing opposition to social change in general and civil 
rights advances in particular. RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAW 4 (1997). And James 
Unnever and Francis Cullen use data from the 2000 National Election Study to demonstrate that racial 
animus appears to play an important role in shaping punitive attitudes towards crime. James D. Unnever 
& Francis T. Cullen, The Social Sources of Americans’ Punitiveness: A Test of Three Competing 
Models, 48 CRIMINOLOGY 99, 119 (2010). 
 49. Forman, supra note 45, provides a good summary of these and other criticism of the “New Jim 
Crow” hypothesis. 
 50. Approximately 93% of all black murders were intraracial crimes. See ALEXIA COOPER & ERICA 
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homicide rate for young black men was nearly ten times that for 
young white men. More generally, between 1980 and 2008, blacks 
made up 47% of all murder victims and 52% of all murderers.51 
Similar patterns hold across other offenses. According to the 2008 
National Crime Victimization Survey, blacks were disproportionately 
likely to be the victims of violent and property crime. For violent 
crimes, their victimization rate was 25.9 per 1,000 households, 
compared to 18.1 per 1,000 for whites; for property crimes, a rate of 
158, compared to 130.2 for whites.52 And blacks are similarly 
overrepresented among violent offenders: victims report that 22.8% 
of their attackers were black—which is actually not that far off from 
the overall arrest rate of 28.3%.53 Thus at least some of the racial 
disparity in the criminal justice system is due to differences in 
offending, and thus also victimization, rates.54 
                                                                                                                                         
L. SMITH, HOMICIDE TRENDS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1980–2008, at 13 (2011). 
 51. Id. at 12. 
 52. US DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES, 2008 STATISTICAL 
TABLES, tbls.5 & 16 (2010). 
 53. Id. at tbl.40. Henry Ruth and Kevin Reitz suggest that the punishment disparities for significant 
violent crimes—homicide, rape, robbery, serious assault—are roughly in keeping with disparities in 
offending; the imprisonment disparities for lesser offenses do not track offending differences nearly as 
closely. See HENRY RUTH & KEVIN REITZ, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME 35 (2003). That a majority of all 
prisoners (52.4% overall and 54.1% of black prisoners) are in prison for violent crimes suggests that 
differentials in serious offending do play an important role in explaining differences in incarceration 
rates. For the incarceration data, see SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS, supra note 46, at 
tbl.6.0001. 
 54. None of this discussion should be read as downplaying an important feedback loop between 
punishment and offending. Conviction and incarceration often bring with them significant collateral 
consequences: restrictions on housing, welfare benefits, employment options, and so on. And these 
limitations could themselves contribute to future offending—and thus to the racial disparity in 
offending. The criminal justice system is thus responding to offending differentials that it has helped to 
create, or at least magnify. 
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Unlike violent and property offenses, however, drug offenses 
provide much more room for discretionary responses, which is why 
many advocates of the anti-Civil Rights hypothesis focus on them. 
Their motivation is clear. Data indicate that blacks and whites use 
drugs at roughly similar rates, yet in 2006 blacks comprised 35% of 
all drug arrests, 44% of all drug convictions, and 45% of all prisoners 
serving time for drug convictions; note, though, that dealing is more 
likely to result in incarceration than using, and racial breakdowns on 
dealing are harder to come by.55 Moreover, the police have the ability 
to concentrate or distribute the racial impact of drug enforcement. 
Tracey Meares and Dan Kahan, for example, have argued that 
reverse stings, which would focus on buyers rather than sellers, 
would have less-concentrated racial effects while still being as 
effective as the current supply-side approaches.56 
                                                                                                                                         
 55. ALEXANDER, supra note 45, at 97 n.10, provides a good list of sources concerning drug use. For 
the arrest, conviction, and incarceration data, see SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS, 
supra note 46, at tbls.4.10, 5.45, & 6.0001, respectively. Although more recent data are available for 
arrests and incarceration, 2006 is the last year for which there is conviction data. 
 56. Tracey L. Meares & Dan M. Kahan, Law and (Norms of) Order in the Inner City, 32 L. & SOC’Y 
REV. 805, 816–19 (1998). 
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And it could very well be that the heavy reliance on supply-side 
enforcement is either motivated by, or tolerated because of, some 
degree of racial animus.57 Yet even if true, this does not imply that 
the war on drugs has played a direct, major role in prison growth. 
Figure 13 plots the share of state prisoners whose primary 
convictions are drug violations. The run-up between 1980 and 1990 
is dramatic, but after peaking at around 22% in 1990, the share has 
declined to about 18% today.58 Even if we released every offender 
currently serving time for a drug conviction, the US prison 
population would remain above 1 million, and the racial composition 
of its prisons would not shift much.59 The police arrest a lot of people 
for drugs—over 1.3 million in 2008, or approximately 12% of the 
10.6 million total arrests made—but only a fraction of those arrests 
result in incarceration. 
                                                                                                                                         
 57. Reality is, of course, somewhat more complicated. As Forman, supra note 45, at 115 points out, 
black political groups often lobbied for tougher drug laws and more rigorous drug enforcement, since 
the communities that incurred the costs of the government’s war on drugs were also the ones that 
suffered the most from the various harms drugs and drug markets cause. 
 58. The federal system is a notorious outlier: in 2011, 50.7% of its prisoners were serving time for 
drug charges. See SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS, supra note 46, at tbl.6.0023.2011. 
This reflects the limited scope of federal criminal jurisdiction. Since the federal system holds only about 
13% of all prisoners, its disproportionate focus on drug offenses does not significantly alter the national 
picture. 
 59. Using 2008 data, the population would fall from 1.4 million to 1.1 million, and the percent of 
prisoners who are black would decline from 38% to 36%. 
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There is, however, an indirect way that the war on drugs could still 
matter, perhaps importantly. It is hard to estimate how many 
offenders in prison for violent or property crimes would have 
received at most probation had it not been for their prior records—
and many of their priors could be for drug arrests that on their own 
did not result in incarceration. These inmates do not count as “drug 
offenders” in prison data, but they are in prison (or are in prison for 
longer) because of their prior drug arrests. In this way, the war on 
drugs could play an important role in driving prison growth, and 
perhaps in a way that exacerbates underlying racial differences. But it 
is hard if not impossible to detect this effect with currently-available 
data. 
Finally, it is important to again return our focus to local actors. 
Consider, for example, the following two facts: New York State 
adopted its draconian Rockefeller Drug Laws in 1973, but as of the 
early 1980s only 5% of its inmates were serving time for drug 
offenses, a percent that would rise to over 30% by 1991.60 Just 
                                                                                                                                         
 60. The data are from the New York State Department of Corrections. 
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because state-level politicians had passed a punitive law did not mean 
that local officials immediately used it. And given that counties are 
more racially homogenous than states, the racial perceptions of 
county-level actors—and thus their motivations—may differ 
systematically from those at the state level. 
Regardless, when it comes to prison growth there is an even easier 
claim: whatever the racial motivations of county officials, increases 
in drug incarcerations explain only a fraction of prison growth, so 
any reduction in drug commitments will have only a moderate effect 
on prison population size. Changes in arrests and convictions, 
however, may matter more. 
CONCLUSION 
Those who wish to rein in prison growth in the United Stated need 
to answer two questions: who is responsible for the growth, and why 
are they acting the way they are? I argue here that we have a good 
idea of the answer to the first question but only a weak understanding 
of that for the second. With regards to “who,” the answer appears to 
be prosecutors, at least since the crime drop began in the early 1990s. 
Crime has been falling, arrests per crime have been relatively flat 
(with a slight rise in the 2000s due to drug arrests), admissions per 
felony filing have not budged, and time served has been relatively 
stable. But felony filings per arrest have soared during the 1990s and 
2000s. 
The “why” question is much harder. If nothing else, almost all 
research on the causes of increased incarceration have focused on 
federal- or state-level actors. But prosecutors are county officials, and 
they may be subject to different pressures; if nothing else, state-level 
analyses cannot capture the moral hazard problem of county-level 
officials using state-level resources. It does appear, however, that 
expanding state fiscal capacity has played some role in the growth 
during the 1990s and 2000s. And while political shifts likely 
contributed to the growth as well, it appears that the “politics of 
crime” are changing again in response to sustained low crime rates, 
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and that local actors are subject to qualitatively different political 
forces than the state- and national-level politicians who have been the 
subject of most research. Beyond crime and resources, however, the 
“why” picture remains particularly unclear, especially now that we 
know who is most responsible. 
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